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ABSTRACT
Governments and researchers are frequently forced to predict the impact of per-
spective mergers on markets. This dissertation provides structural methods to em-
pirically evaluate mergers.
We first build a static model in which players are boundedly rational to evaluate
the welfare consequence of mergers in that environment. Then we use that model
studying bidding in the Texas electricity market, a market in which bidding by some
firms departs significantly from what Bayesian Nash models predict, while bidding
from other firms closely resembles these predictions. Our results show that exoge-
nously increasing sophistication may significantly increase efficiency and additionally,
mergers may increase efficiency even without cost synergies.
The next chapter provides a structural method to empirically evaluate mergers in
a dynamic setting. We build an infinite five-step repeated game. Then, we propose
a three-step estimation method to estimate the game in which Markov perfect Nash
equilibrium is played. Our three-step estimation method is flexible and can be easily
modified to estimate various market structures.
These dissertation studies mergers in more realistic settings. We first show that
mergers that do not generate cost synergies may also increase efficiency when some of
the firms in the market are boundedly rational. Then we build a dynamic endogenous
merger game and provide a new method to estimate it. Our simulation result shows
that our estimation method is computational feasible and can be applied to real data.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Static oligopoly models are often used by governments to simulate welfare con-
sequences of prospective mergers and challenge those mergers predicted to decrease
welfare. However, firm behaviors might deviate from assumptions in these models.
This dissertation provides methods to evaluate mergers in more realistic settings.
In the next chapter, we build and estimate a model in which firms are bound-
edly rational and simulate the effect of mergers in such settings. In most oligopoly
models, firms are modeled as playing some form of Nash equilibrium. This model
of supply-side behavior is used to estimate parameters with implications for policy.
However, evidence exists that real-world firms may be boundedly rational, engaging
in some level of strategic thinking, but the degree of strategic thinking may “fall
short” of playing the Nash equilibrium strategy (e.g. Hortac¸su and Puller [2008] and
Goldfarb and Xiao [2011]). Moreover, deviations from Nash equilibrium play can
be economically significant and have implications for efficiency. Hortac¸su and Puller
[2008] identify a set of firms that submit bids into Texas electricity auctions that
persistently and substantially deviate from Nash bidding. The consequence of these
deviations is that low-cost power plants are not called to produce, and this substan-
tially raises total production costs. We embed a Cognitive Hierarchy model into a
structural model of bidding behavior to capture the heterogeneity in the observed
deviations from Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding. We use this model to study the
firms in the Texas electricity spot market. Our results show that efficiency increases
with strategic sophistication and mergers may also increase efficiency even with no
cost synergies and increasing market concentration.
In the third section, we study mergers in a dynamic setting where firms maximize
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their long-term profits. In standard merger simulation exercises, only changes in the
period right after the mergers are considered in a merger review. There are many
reasons to believe long-term welfare changes after a merger should be reviewed as
well as a merger could have considerable impact on the dynamic evolution of the
market. The literature has moved very slowly in developing such methods because of
the complication of modeling dynamic mergers and computational burden involved
in estimating the model. In recent years, researchers have proposed several new
methods to ease the computational burden of estimating dynamic oligopoly model.
In this chapter, we extend the classic Ericson and Pakes [1995] oligopoly dynamic
model and include merger as a dynamic strategy in the game. In particular, we
build an infinite five-step repeated game. Then, we propose a three-step estimation
method to estimate the game in which Markov perfect Nash equilibrium is played.
The first two steps follow Bajari et al. [2007] to ease the computational burden of
estimating dynamic oligopoly models. The third step applies the moment inequality
condition estimation method proposed in Tamer [2003], which solves the inference
of multiple equilibria in discrete choice games. Our three-step estimation method is
flexible and can be easily modified to estimate various market structures.
2
2. STRATEGIC ABILITY AND PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY IN
ELECTRICITY MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
Models of strategic equilibrium form the foundation of many studies in indus-
trial organization that investigate market efficiency in oligopoly settings. Firms are
modeled as playing some form of Nash Equilibrium, and that model of supply-side
behavior is used to estimate parameters with implications for policy. For exam-
ple, firms competing in differentiated product markets are modeled as engaging in
Bertrand-Nash competition in order to estimate marginal costs or to predict market
outcomes under alternative market structures. When studying auctions, researchers
use a Bayesian Nash model of bidding to “invert” bids to estimate valuations and
then conduct counterfactual experiments to predict market outcomes under alterna-
tive auction formats.
However, some research has suggested caution at applying such strategic equilib-
rium models in all settings, because while in a Nash equilibrium each firm is best
responding to its beliefs about each rival firm’s behavior and all of those beliefs
are mutually consistent, in real-world settings, the rationality assumption or mutual
consistency assumption may break down, and firms may not be playing at the fixed
point that equilibrium models characterize. Indeed, evidence exists that real-world
firms may be boundedly rational, engaging in some level of strategic thinking, but
the degree of strategic thinking may “fall short” of playing the Nash equilibrium
strategy (e.g. Hortac¸su and Puller [2008] and Goldfarb and Xiao [2011]).
Deviations from Nash equilibrium play can be economically significant and have
implications for efficiency. Indeed, Hortac¸su and Puller [2008] (hereafter HP) identify
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a set of firms that submit bids into electricity auctions that persistently deviate from
Nash bidding and do so substantially. The consequence of these deviations is that
low-cost powerplants are not called to produce, and this substantially raises total
production costs. Overall, 81% if productive inefficiencies are caused by low-cost
firms departing from Nash bidding, while the rest corresponds to the exploitation of
market power.
This suggests that models allowing for boundedly rational firm behavior can be
valuable for explaining the outcomes of certain real-world markets. To this extent,
theoretical research has developed models that help organize strategic behavior that
deviates from the Nash equilibrium.1 Examples of such models include level-k think-
ing and Cognitive Hierarchy in which players best-respond to (perhaps incorrect)
beliefs about their rival behavior. The Cognitive Hierarchy model (hereafter CH) al-
lows for heterogeneity in the levels of strategic thinking by firms in a market. In the
CH model, the least strategic players – Level-0 players – are entirely non-strategic in
their bidding. Level-1 players assume that all other players are level-0 players and
submit bids that correspond to the best response to all other players behaving as
such. Level-2 players assume that all other players are some combination of level-0 or
level-1 players and best respond to those beliefs. In general, level-k players assume
that all other players are distributed between level-0 and level–k-1 and submit bids
corresponding to the best response to those beliefs. The limiting case of this model
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium.2 In this setting, CH maintains the assumption
1A rich literature in experimental economics has studied the behavior of laboratory participants
in strategic games such a beauty contest games, documented deviation from Nash equilibrium
play, and developed hierarchy models that can explain such behavior. For examples, see Nagel
[1995], Stahl and Wilson [1995], Costa-Gomes et al. [2001], Crawford et al. [2008], and Arad and
Rubinstein [2012].
2As noted in Camerer et al. [2004], the limiting case of the Poisson-CH model corresponds to the
Nash equilibrium as long as the Nash equilibrium is reached by finitely-many iterations of weakly
dominated strategies; other Nash equilibria may not correspond to this case.
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that players best respond, but it allows for firms to have beliefs about their rival s-
trategies that are not consistent with the rivals’ actual behavior. This model has the
appealing feature that it allows for a hierarchy of levels of sophistication by different
players in a market.
Despite the availability of theoretical models of boundedly rational behavior, it
is difficult to use data from field settings to apply such models, as there is a critical
identification problem if the goal is to uniquely identify market fundamentals. To see
this, consider studies that apply the standard “IO inversion” approach – use a model
that maps marginal cost (or valuation) to prices (or bids), and then “invert” the
model so that data on prices (or bids) can be used to estimate the underlying marginal
cost (or valuation). This approach – used in many oligopoly and auction settings –
hinges on the assumption of a “unique” model of firm strategic behavior. Otherwise,
multiple combinations of behavior and costs or valuations are consistent with the
observed prices or bids. Bounded rationality models, such as cognitive hierarchy,
allow for multiple forms of strategic behavior, so that researchers, in general, cannot
separately identify the cognitive hierarchy structure from costs or valuations.3
However, this empirical challenge can be overcome if researchers have data on
both the prices (bids) and the marginal cost (valuation). In this paper, we exploit
such a data-rich environment in the context of electricity auctions. In these auctions,
firms owning powerplants bid hourly to supply power to the ‘spot market’ that
balances real-time supply and demand of electricity in Texas. Firms submit offers to
supply different quantities of power at different prices. The grid operator clears this
3One novel approach to address this problem has been proposed by Gillen [2010] who studies
joint identification of types and valuations in the level-k setting. Gillen shows point identification of
the joint distribution could be obtained exploiting variation in the number of bidders and assuming
constant valuations across auctions. However, in the absence of either of these, only set identification
is possible. An [2013] also studies identification in the level-k model but he relaxes some of these
assumptions present in Gillen’s work but imposes constraints on the structure of the data to identify
both the number of types in the data and the type of each firm.
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market using a multi-unit, uniform-price auction – essentially aggregating supply bids
and finding the market-clearing price that equates aggregate supply and demand. A
unique feature of this setting is that we have data on each firm’s hourly marginal
cost of supply and each firm’s hourly supply bids.
In this setting, HP show evidence that firms deviate from Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium bidding, suggesting a fruitful environment to apply bounded rationality models.
HP test whether each firm submits bids that correspond to the best response to ri-
vals’ actual bids (as required if firms play a Nash equilibrium) and find that a few
firms – typically larger firms – submit bids close to best-response bidding. However,
many small firms tend to bid to supply power at prices so far above their marginal
costs that they “bid themselves out of the market” and are not called to produce
despite having low-cost generation available.4
The puzzling behavior of firms in the Texas market generates important questions:
1. What type of strategic behavior are the small firms engaging in? And the large
firms?
2. Could mergers that increase strategic sophistication (but do not create cost
synergies) increase efficiency?
3. How much would an (exogenous) increase in strategic sophistication by a firm
or group of firms affect the efficiency of the market?
In this chapter, we address each of these questions. Specifically, we embed a Cog-
nitive Hierarchy model into a structural model of bidding behavior to capture the
heterogeneity in the observed deviations from Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding.
The Texas electricity market has firms of various sizes and organizational structures
4HP rule out a number of alternative explanations for such steep bids such as collusion, the
presence of transmission constraints, and unmeasured adjustment costs.
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that bid into the spot market, and we use firm observables to parameterize the deter-
minants of firm type. We estimate the model using a minimum-distance approach.
We then turn to study how strategic sophistication affects productive efficien-
cy. We do this by simulating a number of scenarios in which the level of strategic
sophistication of low-type firms is increased either exogenously or through mergers
with high-type firms. Importantly, the application of the CH model to multi-unit
auctions has very valuable methodological benefit in this setting. As shown in K-
lemperer and Meyer [1989], in general there are multiple equilibria in multi-unit,
uniform-price auctions that can range from competitive to Cournot-like behavior.
The multiplicity of equilibria presents a challenge for conducting counterfactual cal-
culations of market outcomes under changes in cost or market structure. One way
to address this problem has been to impose mathematical restrictions on permissible
form of bids, such as restricting bid functions to be linear (Baldick et al. [2004]).
The CH model provides a means to address the multiple equilibria problem without
imposing such restrictions. The mutually consistent beliefs assumption – a source of
the multiple equilibria problem – is not imposed in CH. Instead, given a firm’s belief
about its rivals’ type distribution, one can calculate the (unique) best-response bid.5
Therefore, the iterative nature of strategic thinking under CH allows to calculate
unique counterfactual market outcomes. We exploit this feature by computing mar-
ket efficiency under possible mergers between firms with different levels of strategic
sophistication, which would not be possible under a Nash equilibrium model. Thus,
not only does CH allow for more realistic models of real-world bidding behavior, but
it allows researchers to more precisely simulate outcomes under changes in market
structure or changes in costs.
5Camerer et al. [2004] note a related feature that the CH model can be viewed as a behavioral
refinement that can eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
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Thus, we are able to simulate unique predictions of market outcomes under vari-
ous policy counterfactuals. For example, consider a merger between a large and small
bidder in this electricity market. Such a merger is unlikely to lead to substantial cost
synergies because the costs of generating electricity is almost entirely driven by the
model and vintage of the electric generator. Thus, one might expect the increase in
concentration induced by the merger to enhance market power and reduce economic
efficiency. However, in a merger between two boundedly rational firms, this merger
could increase efficiency. Indeed, suppose that the large firm is a high-level strategic
thinker and the small firm is a low-level strategic thinker. If the merger caused the
large firm to take over bidding operations, then the generation resources of the small
firm would subsequently be controlled by a higher level strategic thinker. This could
increase efficiency because the low-k firm would be less likely to bid prices so high
that its efficient productive capacity is priced out of the market. We can evaluate
this conjecture by simulating mergers between any firms in the Texas market. More
generally, we can calculate market prices and efficiency under any counterfactual
level of strategic sophistication by any firm.
Our results show that efficiency increases with strategic sophistication, though
at a decreasing rate. Indeed, exogenously increasing sophistication of low-type firms
results in reducing inefficiencies by up to 24% relative to the status quo. However,
the number of firms whose sophistication matters and increasing sophistication of
any single small firm has little impact on efficiency. On the other hand, we also find
that it is not necessary to increase sophistication to the maximum estimated level
to achieve significant efficiency gains. Indeed, increasing sophistication to that of
the median firm is enough to generate essentially same efficiency gains as increasing
sophistication to the maximum observed level. Finally, mergers may also increase
efficiency even with no cost synergies and increasing market concentration. Our
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results show that when, for example, a small, low-type firm, merges with a large,
high-type firm, as long as the resulting firm is of the same type as the largest involved
in the merger, efficiency may increase by 68%.
This chapter contributes to an emerging body of literature that empirically mod-
els sophistication and learning in new markets. The most prominent paper that has
applied a cognitive hierarchy model to field data is Goldfarb and Xiao [2011] who
study the entry decisions into newly opened markets for local telephone competition.
They apply the cognitive hierarchy model to an entry game and find that manager
characteristics such as experience and education are determinants of strategic abil-
ity that predict firm performance. Related work by Doraszelski et al. [2014] use
models of learning to predict the evolution of pricing in a newly opened electricity
ancillary service market. This chapter also contributes to the literature on how elec-
tricity generating firms formulate bids (e.g. Fabra and Reguant [2014]) and research
that models oligopoly competition in the electricity sector (e.g. Wolfram [1998] and
Bushnell et al. [2008]).
2.2 Institutional Setting
Hortac¸su and Puller [2008] describe the Texas electricity market in detail, so here
we focus only on key aspects of it. The Texas electricity market was restructured in
August 2001. Since then, firms are no longer part of a natural monopoly and most
of the electricity is now traded through bilateral forward contracts between gener-
ators and electricity consumers. However, aggregate demand may fall beyond or
below contracted quantities at the last-minute. To meet the shortage or surplus, the
generation firms submit bids to adjust their production relative to contracted quan-
tities. They do this by participating in an hourly “balancing market” administered
by ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas). This market trades between 2
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and 5% of all power traded in Texas. The hourly market is cleared by a multi-unit,
uniform-price auction in which firms bid supply functions and winning sellers earn
the price at which aggregate supply bids equal demand. Firms do this by submit-
ting schedules of quantities of electricity to inject and withdraw at specific locations
on the transmission grid to ERCOT, the day before electricity transmission occurs.
These are called day-ahead schedules and may differ from the firms’ forward con-
tract. These supply and demand schedules may also differ from actual production
and consumption in real time because of a variety of reasons such as extreme hot or
cold weather. Depending upon whether there is shortage or surplus of power relative
to the day-ahead schedule, balancing demand can be positive or negative. Because
demand does not respond to prices in real time, balancing demand is a perfectly
inelastic.
In this setting, firms submit bids that increase or decrease the amount of power
to supply relative to their day-ahead schedule. In addition, bids may be changed
up until one hour prior to the operating hour. The market is then cleared every 15-
minute using a uniform-price, multi-unit auction. ERCOT determines the market
clearing price aggregating supply bids and intersecting the aggregate supply curve
with total demand. A generator called to increase production is paid the market
clearing price, while a generator called to decrease production purchases power from
ERCOT at the same price to meet existing contract obligations.
In the Texas electricity market, the generation technology is mainly fueled by nat-
ural gas and coal with small amounts of hydroelectric, nuclear, and wind generation.
TXU and Reliant are the two largest players and they are the two largest former
incumbent utilities, owning 24% and 18% of installed capacity, respectively. Oth-
er major investor-owned utilities include Central Power and Light (7% of installed
capacity) and West Texas Utilities (2%). There are also some municipal utilities,
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among which the largest are City of San Antonio Public Service (8% of installed
capacity) and City of Austin (6%). Finally, there is a large number of merchant
generation firms of various sizes, such as Calpine (5%).
2.3 Data
We study bidding behavior in the Texas electricity market starting after it was re-
structured in September 2001 until January 2003. As HP, we focus on non-congested
weekdays between 6:00 and 6:15pm because the most flexible type of generators that
can respond to balancing calls without large adjustment costs are likely to be on-
line at this period. Non-congested periods account for 74% of all periods between
September 2001 and January 2003. Finally, in our sample, we consider auctions for
which we have bid and marginal cost data for all firms included in the Cognitive
Hierarchy.
We argue that each firm’s marginal cost data is public information.6 The pro-
duction technologies used by power plants in Texas are very similar to each other
and data on the fuel cost of each generating units are publicly available. Moreover,
firms know whether major generating units are on- or off-line at any time. Also,
some firms purchase large plants’ generation data from Genscape, an energy infor-
mation company that measures real time output by remote sensors installed near the
transmission lines.
Overall, our data consists on information that allow us to calculate each firm’s
best-response bids in each auction, for all possible levels of strategic sophistication.
In particular, for each auction, we have data on total balancing demand, firm-level
marginal cost functions, and firm-level bids, as well as information on firm charac-
teristics.
6HP claimed that conversations with several market participants suggest that traders have good
information on their rivals’ marginal costs.
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2.3.1 Descriptive Evidence
We study bidding into the Texas electricity spot market in the first two years
after the market was created in 2001. The spot market – called the balancing market
in electricity parlance – is an hourly auction to supply power to the grid operator
in order to ensure that supply equals demand at every point in time. Electricity
generating firms will have scheduled a certain amount of production the day-ahead,
and the balancing market is a mechanism to adjust production up or down from
that day-ahead production plan. Each firm submits an hourly bid function for its
entire portfolio of plants to increase or decrease production relative to the day-
ahead schedule. Market demand is determined by unexpected changes in the amount
of power needed. For example, if the weather is unexpectedly hot on a summer
afternoon, then balancing demand is positive. The grid operator uses a uniform-
price, multi-unit auction; so the market is cleared each period by intersecting the
hourly aggregate supply bids with the total balancing demand.
We start this section explaining how bids would be chosen in which firms best
respond to their rivals actions. Figure 2.1 explains the basic intuition of best-response
bidding in this market. Suppose that a firm has marginal cost of supplying to the
balancing market given by MCi(q). In addition, assume that the firm has forward
contracts to supply QCi units of power. Because the firm is a net seller after it has
covered its contract position, the firm has incentives to bid prices above marginal
cost for quantities greater than QCi.
7 The size of the mark-up will depend on the
firm’s residual demand elasticity. The residual demand function RDi is equal to the
total market demand minus the supply bids by all other bidders. Suppose that it is
an expectedly hot day and the firm faces RD1 shown in figure 2.1. Then the firm has
7Likewise, the firm is a net buyer for quantities less than QCi, so it has incentives to bid prices
below MC for quantities less than the contract position.
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the incentive to bid a quantity corresponding to the point where Marginal Revenue
equals Marginal Cost (MR1 = MCi) and a price corresponding to the (inverse)
Residual Demand function at that quantity. This point is given by point A in the
figure. However, suppose instead that it is a cool day and the firm faces a different
residual demand function of RD2. In that case, the same logic implies that the best
response is point B. Because the firm can submit a large number of (price, quantity)
points, it can consider a continuum of different residual demand functions. Thus,
the firm can “trace out” the set of best-response bids, and submit a best-response
bid function given by the red line SBRi .
8 Importantly, no estimation is required; the
components of figure 2.1 are available as data for each firm in each auction. We view
this data-rich environment as a major strength of our approach. Data on marginal
cost are critical to our identification strategy that allows us to identify strategic
behavior.
We now present descriptive evidence that some firms deviate from Bayesian Nash
equilibrium bidding, and we use this evidence to motivate our modeling assumptions.
Figure 2.2 displays representative bid functions for a large firm that submits bids
close to best-response bids. For two different auctions, the figure shows the firm’s
marginal cost of supplying more power to the grid. In the left figure, the firm had
a contract position of nearly 600 MW, so it bid above (below) marginal cost for
quantities above (below) that contract position. This firm submitted an actual bid
function that was very close to our calculation of the best-response bid function. The
right graph shows a similar outcome.
However, many of the small firms in this market do not submit bids close to the
best-response bid function. Figure 2.3 shows representative bids for one of these
8In general, it is possible that the set of best-response points is not monotonic function, however
we show in section 2.5.2 that in this setting the best-response points are monotonic.
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Figure 2.1: Best-response bidding in spot auction
small firms. This firm has a contract position of zero. As shown by the best-
response bid that we calculate, this firm has some market power despite being small,
so it is optimal to bid prices several dollars above marginal cost. However, this firm
submitted bids at extremely high prices for small quantities, making it unlikely that
the firm will be called to produce. The consequence of these bids is two-fold: (1) the
firm reduces profits, and (2) the market is not efficient because the firm’s relatively
low cost production is not utilized.
The patterns displayed above are persistent throughout the early years of the
market. We estimate that the firms in this market left between $3-$18 million per
year “on the table”, depending on firm size. This type of bidding behavior serves as
motivation for our model of boundedly rational bidding within a cognitive hierarchy
structure.
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Figure 2.2: Large firm: actual bids vs. best-response bids
Figure 2.3: Small firm: actual bids vs. best-response bids
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2.4 Theoretical Background on Cognitive Hierarchy
The theoretical literature has developed a rich set of models of boundedly ratio-
nal strategic behavior that could explain deviations from Bayesian Nash equilibrium
play. Generally speaking, bounded rationality models relax one of the two conditions
of Nash Equilibrium; that (1) players maximize expected payoffs given beliefs about
their rivals’ actions and (2) that player beliefs about rivals’ actions are consistent.
Hierarchy models (such as Cognitive Hierarchy and level-k) maintain the assumption
of best-response but relax the assumption of consistent beliefs.9 These models con-
ceptualize players as having a hierarchical structure of strategic, or level-k thinking.
Seminal work on level-k behavioral models has been conducted by Costa-Gomes et
al. [2001], Crawford and Iriberri [2007], and Camerer et al. [2004].
Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) developed by Camerer et al. [2004] conceptualizes
players as engaging in different levels of strategic thinking ordered in a hierarchy.
As explained above, the least sophisticated players – 0-step players – engage in no
strategic thinking, while higher types (say, k) assume that all other players are dis-
tributed between 0-step and k-1-step players according to a Poisson distribution.
10 Importantly, a player’s belief about rivals need not be correct; hence, the beliefs
are not mutually consistent. However, each player rationally best-responds given
its (perhaps incorrect) beliefs, meaning that CH maintains the rationality assump-
tion of Nash Equilibrium but relaxes the assumption of mutually consistent beliefs.
9Another model used in the bounded rationality literature – Quantal Response Equilibrium
(McKelvey and Palfrey [1995]) – does not appear to be suitable in our particular setting. QRE has
the property that players play more profitable strategies with higher probability. However, small
players in our setting systematically play low-profit strategies; for example, see figure 2.3. In other
words, it does not appear that bidders in the electricity auctions estimate expected payoffs in an
unbiased way, a key feature of the QRE model.
10The model does not require the distribution be Poisson. However, Camerer et al. [2004] note
that the Poisson has the property that as k rises, fewer players perform the next step of thinking,
which is consistent with increasing working memory being required for an additional step of iterative
calculation.
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This cognitive hierarchy structure is conceptually appealing because it captures be-
havior in which firms have limits to the level of strategic thinking and/or firms are
overconfident about their own abilities.
The level-k model is a specific form of the CH model where a level-k player
assumes that all other players are level-(k-1). In other words, rather than rivals
coming from a distribution of types (k-1) and below, in the level-k model, rival firms
are type (k-1). Comparing the two models, in one sense CH is a more flexible model.
However, one could also view CH as a model that could be too flexible and explain
“anything”. In this paper, however, we sidestep this theoretical debate and rather
write down an empirical model that is most general – cognitive hierarchy – and
estimate the model with our data.
2.4.1 Big Picture of Modeling and Estimation Strategy
The iterative nature of decision rules under CH facilitates a computationally
tractable empirical strategy. For any firm i in auction t, we have data on the marginal
cost of supplying power to the grid. We begin by defining the bidding behavior for
a non-strategic 0-step player. This definition will be critical, so we spend time
developing the rationale for that assumed behavior, but take that bidding behavior
as given for the moment.
Consider firm i that is type k. The assumptions of the CH model imply that
i believes its rivals are distributed between type-0 and type-(k-1), according to a
normalized Poisson distribution with parameter τ . Firm i decides its bidding strategy
according to these beliefs (that depend on its own type, contract position, and its
rivals τ ’s) and valuations (marginal costs), to maximize its expected profits.
One critical feature of estimating a CH model is how to define level-0 behavior (or
in the language of Camerer et al. “0-step players”). In the theoretical literature, a
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common assumption is that level-0 players (uniformly) randomize across all possible
strategies, although that assumption can be relaxed to match a particular setting
(i.e., Goldfarb and Xiao [2011] assume level-0 players to believe they are monopolists
in an entry game). In the context of the Texas electricity auctions, there is a natural
assumption about non-strategic thinkers: we observe some firms bidding “vertically”
at their contract positions for the range of plausible prices. (That is, the firms
submit bids similar to the second panel of figure 2.3. In other words, these firms
are indicating that at even very high prices, they do not want to sell power into
the balancing market. This clearly violates any standard model of (expected) profit-
maximization; the firms have low cost generation to offer into the market, but they
choose not to do so. Thus, “vertical bidding at the contract position” is a natural
candidate for level-0 bidding behavior.
One of the advantages of this approach is that we do not need to make strong
assumptions about the form of the bid functions. Instead, as we show below, the
assumption of level-0 bidders bidding vertically at their contract positions together
with the recursive solution method of the CH model allow us to completely character-
ize the bidding functions without further assumptions about how private information
enters the bidding decision.
Finally, we assume that not all firms engage in strategic thinking or even enter
the Cognitive Hierarchy. Indeed, we allow only a subset of firms to enter the hierar-
chy, while the rest form part of an unmodeled fringe. We do this because allowing
for more firms makes the problem computationally challenging as each firm needs
to compute its rivals bidding functions for all possible types, for all auctions. Fur-
thermore, we do not have marginal cost data for all firms for all auctions, which also
imposes a constraint on the number of firms that we can include in the Cognitive Hi-
erarchy. Accordingly, we model all “big” firms entering the Cognitive Hierarchy plus
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a number of small ones including the one depicted in figure 2.3. This, however, has
the unintended cost of limiting the extent to which our counterfactual simulations
can improve efficiency, as part of the inefficiencies that result from departure from
Bayesian Nash bidding is generated by firms that we do not include in the cognitive
hierarchy.
Once level-0 bidding is defined, we can use our data on each firm’s marginal cost
to calculate the predicted bidding behavior for a firm of any type k > 0. Specifically,
given the assumption about level-0 players and a fixed vector τ = {τ1, ..., τN} denot-
ing N firms’ levels of strategic sophistication, which depend on firm characteristics,
Xi, we use an iterative process provided by the CH model to calculate each player’s
optimal theoretical bids under various sophistication levels. Then, based on informa-
tion about players’ type distribution Poisson(τi), we calculate players’ theoretical
optimal bids.
We then compare these bids to the firm’s actual bidding behavior. The estima-
tion process finds the parameters of τ – how firm characteristics such as size affect
strategic sophistication – that minimize the distance between actual bids and the
bids predicted under CH. That is, in estimation, we use observed bids and realized
marginal costs to recover the type of each firm. For this reason, it is critical that
we observe marginal costs, as in the absence of realized costs, one would not be able
to identify types from bid data without additional assumptions regarding the cost
function.11 In other words, instead of using data on observed bids to recover valua-
tions, we use that we observe valuations and bids to recover the type that rationalizes
observed behavior.
11Specifically, without any assumption on the form of the cost function, it is always possible to
recover a cost function that rationalizes observed bids.
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2.4.2 Modeling in Detail
A formal model of bidding into the Texas electricity auctions needs to formulate
best-response bidding in a setting where firms have beliefs about rivals as charac-
terized by the Cognitive Hierarchy model. We have developed a formulation that
incorporates modeling features of share auction models (Wilson [1979] and Hortac¸su
and Puller [2008]) and the Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy model (Camerer et al. [2004]).
Demand for power in each spot auction is given by D˜t(pt) = Dt(pt) + εt which
is the sum of a deterministic and stochastic component. The auctions occur in a
private values setting where the private value is the firm’s variable cost of providing
power to the grid. Firm i has costs to supply power in period t given by Cit(q).
Prior to the auction, each firm has signed contracts to deliver certain quantities of
power each hour QCit at price PCit. As in HP, we take these contracts to be pre-
determined. Cit(q) is public information and QCit is private information. Each firm
is a k-step thinker. Firm i has private information on its own type ki, but it only
knows the distribution from which rival types are drawn. In each auction, firms
simultaneously submit supply schedules Skit(p,QCit) to produce different quantities
at different prices. Let the bid function by rival j of type l be denoted Sljt(·).
All sellers are paid the market-clearing price, which is determined by:
N∑
i=1
Sit(p
c
t , QCit) = Dt(p
c
t) + εt (2.1)
From the perspective of firm i with private information on ki, QCi, and submitting
bid Sˆit(p), the uncertainty can be characterized by defining the following function
H(·) which defines the probability that the market-clearing price pct is below any
20
price level p:
Hit(p, Sˆit(p); ki, QCit) ≡ Pr(pct ≤ p|Sˆit(p), ki, QCit) (2.2)
There are three sources of uncertainty – (1) the shock to demand (εt), (2) each rival’s
type of k-step thinking, and (3) each rival’s contract position QCjt which affects the
rival’s bids. The event that the market-clearing price pct is less than any given price
p is the event that there is excess supply at that p. Plugging the market-clearing
condition (2.1) into (2.2):
Hit(p, Sˆit(p); ki, QCit) = Pr(
∑
j 6=i
Sljt(p,QCjt; ki) + Sˆit(p) ≥ Dt(p) + εt|Sˆit(p), ki, QCit)
=
∫
QC−it×l−i×εt
1(
∑
j 6=i
Sljt(p,QCjt; ki)+
Sˆit(p) ≥ Dt(p) + εt)dF (QC−it, l−i, εt|Sˆit(p), ki, QCit) (2.3)
F (QC−it, l−i, εt|Sˆit(p), ki, QCit) is the joint density of each source of uncertainty
from the perspective of firm i.
A firm’s realized profit in this setting (after the realization of uncertainty) is given
by:
p · Sˆit(p)− Cit
(
Sˆit(p)
)
− (p− PCit)QCit (2.4)
This profit represents spot market revenues minus costs plus the payoff from its
contract position.
We model the bidder’s expected utility maximization problem, where we allow
for bidders to potentially be risk averse. We denote the utility enjoyed by the bidder
earning pi dollars of profit as U(pi). Under the CH model, best-response k−step
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thinking bidders will solve:
Max
Sˆit(p)
∫ p
p
(
U
(
p · Sˆit(p)− Cit
(
Sˆit(p)
)
− (p− PCit)QCit
))
dHit
(
p, Sˆit(p); ki, QCit
)
One can show that the Euler-Lagrange necessary condition for the (pointwise)
optimality of the supply schedule is given by:
p− C ′it (S∗it(p)) = (S∗it(p)−QCit)
Hs (p, S
∗
it(p); ki, QCit)
Hp (p, S∗it(p); ki, QCit)
(2.5)
where Hs and Hp are given by derivatives of (2.3).
There is a simple intuition behind this condition. To see this, for the moment
ignore the term HS
Hp
(it will be positive). The left hand side is the difference between
bid prices and marginal cost. Suppose that the firm is a net seller into the market
because it is supplying more than its contract position (i.e. S(·) > QCit). Then
the firm will have an incentive to bid above marginal cost, i.e. p > C ′it, in order to
“exercise market power”. The amount of market power is determined by the term
HS
Hp
. The denominator of this term is simply the density of the market clearing price.
The numerator is the “market power term” – how much the firm can change the
(distribution of) the market price by changing its supply bid.
The goal is to find S∗it(p) for firm i if the firm is type k – the best-response bid
function for each firm i in auction t if the firm is type k. And in our empirical exercise,
we will compare the firm’s actual bid to each of these best-response functions to make
inferences about what type of k-step thinker the bidder is.
We use detailed data and several identifying assumptions to “measure” each com-
ponent of equation (2.5), which allows us to calculate the best-response function for
each type. In our data, we observe the marginal cost function C ′it, and we follow the
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strategy developed in HP to measure QCit.
Ideally, one would like to (non-parametrically) estimate HS
Hp
as is common in the
T-bill literature (e.g. Hortac¸su and McAdams [2010], Hortac¸su and Kastl [2012],
Kang and Puller [2008]). However, in this institutional setting it is not credible to
pool across auctions or to assume that some subsets of bidders in a given auction
are ex ante symmetric. Therefore, HP follow the approach of assuming that bid
strategies are additively separable in private information (QCit). In addition, HP
also show that expected profit-maximizing bids are ex-post optimal. The intuition is
that in the absence of uncertainty about rivals types, all other sources of uncertainty
affect the intercept but not the slope of residual demand. As a consequence, the
single observed realization of uncertainty is sufficient to calculate RD′(p) under all
possible realizations of uncertainty.
This approach will not work in the Cognitive Hierarchy model. In CH, there is an
additional source of uncertainty – firms have private information on their own type
and uncertainty about their rivals’ types (though the uncertainty is fully character-
ized for a firm of given type k). Intuitively, higher type rivals are likely to submit
bid functions that are “closer” to best response, which in our setting means “flat-
ter”. As a result, uncertainty affects the slope of residual demand, so the expected
profit-maximizing bid function does not reduce to the simple formula developed by
HP.
For this reason, we now make three identifying assumptions so that we can “mea-
sure” Hit
(
p, Sˆit(p); ki, QCit
)
and thus its derivatives Hs and Hp. The first assump-
tion considers how bidders type 0 bid and allows us to solve the problem recursively.
The second assumption considers the distribution of types in the Cognitive Hierar-
chy model. Finally, the third assumption considers the distribution of the remaining
sources of uncertainty.
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Assumption 2.1 Bidders type 0 submit perfectly inelastic bids that are determined
by their contract positions. This is,
S0it(p,QCit) = S
0
it(QCit) = QCit ∀p ∈ [p, p], ∀i ∈ l0,
where l0 represents the set of bidders type 0.
For a bidder type 1, all rivals are type-0 under the CH model. Thus, we can write
H(·) (equation 2.3) for a type-1 firm submitting bid Sˆ1it(p):
Hit(p, Sˆ
1
it(p); ki = 1, QCit) =
∫
QC−it×l−i×εt
1(
∑
j 6=i
S0jt(p,QCjt) + Sˆ
1
it(p) ≥
Dt(p) + εt)dF (QC−it, l−i, εt|Sˆ1it(p), ki = 1, QCit)
=
∫
QC−it×l−i×εt
1(
∑
j 6=i
QCjt − εt ≥
Dt(p)− Sˆ1it(p))dF (QC−it, l−i, εt|Sˆ1it(p), ki = 1, QCit)
=
∫
QC−it×l−i×εt
1(θit ≥ Dt(p)− Sˆ1it(p))
dF (QC−it, l−i, εt|Sˆ1it(p), ki = 1, QCit)
where the second equality follows from Assumption 2.1 and the third equality from
defining θit ≡
∑
j 6=iQCjt − εt.
This tells us that, as a bidder type 1 believes all its rivals are type 0, she expects
all her rivals to submit perfectly inelastic bids determined by her rivals contract
positions (which are private information). Furthermore, conditional on rivals’ types,
uncertainty in rivals’ QCjt and the aggregate demand shock act as shifters in residual
demand (but not pivots). Thus, all that matters with respect to uncertainty about
(QC−it × εt) is the distribution of a scalar random variable θit that is the sum of
rival contract positions
∑
j 6=iQCjt and the aggregate demand shock (−εt).
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Let Γ(·) denote the conditional distribution of θit (conditional on the realization
of all N − 1 draws from the joint distribution of rival types) and let ∆(l−i) denote
the marginal distribution of the vector of rival firm types. Then H(·) becomes:
Hit(p, Sˆit(p); ki = 1, QCit) =
∫
l−i
[
1− Γ
(
Dt(p)− Sˆ1it(p)
)]
·∆(l−i)
Taking derivatives of H(·) to find HS and Hp and plugging into to solve for HSHp :
Hs (p, S
∗
it(p); ki, QCit)
Hp (p, S∗it(p); ki, QCit)
=
∫
l−i
γ
(
Dt(p)− Sˆ1it(p)
)
·∆(l−i)
− ∫
l−i
γ
(
Dt(p)− Sˆ1it(p)
)
D′t(p)∆(l−i)
.
Proposition 2.1 1. If bidders type 0 submit perfectly inelastic bids that are de-
termined by their contract positions in CH model, their bids are additive separable,
S0it(p,QCit) = QCit.
2. If bidders type 0 submit perfectly inelastic bids that are determined by their
contract positions in CH model, bids of bidders type 1 is also additive separable,
S1it(p,QCit) = β
1
it(QCit) + α
1
it(p). Moreover, S
1
it(p,QCit) = QCit + α
1
it(p).
Proof. 1. It is straight forward to see that bids of bidders type 0 are additive sepa-
rable because S0it(p,QCit) = QCit = QCit + f(p), where f(p) = 0, ∀p ∈ [p, p¯].
2. Bids of bidders type 1 S1it(p) can be calculated from equation (2.5), which can be
rewritten as
S1it(p) =
[
(p− C ′it
(
S1it(p)
)] Hp (p, S1it(p); ki, QCit)
Hs (p, S1it(p); ki, QCit)
+QCit
=
[
(p− C ′it
(
S1it(p)
)] ∫l−i γ (Dt(p)− Sˆ1it(p)) ·∆(l−i)
− ∫
l−i
γ
(
Dt(p)− Sˆ1it(p)
)
D′t(p)∆(l−i)
+QCit
= α1it(p) +QCit
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because the argument [(p− C ′it (S1it(p))]
∫
l−i γ(Dt(p)−Sˆ
1
it(p))·∆(l−i)
− ∫l−i γ(Dt(p)−Sˆ1it(p))D′t(p)∆(l−i) is a function of
price p.
Therefore, bids of bidders type 1 are additive separable and can be represented by
S1it(p) = α
1
it(p) +QCit, where α
1
it(p) = [(p− C ′it (S1it(p))]
∫
l−i γ(Dt(p)−Sˆ
1
it(p))·∆(l−i)
− ∫l−i γ(Dt(p)−Sˆ1it(p))D′t(p)∆(l−i) .

For a bidder type 2 the procedure to derive optimal bids is exactly the same, with
one difference. Rival firms j are now either type-0 or type-1 with additive separable
bids. This is, for a firm bidding Sˆ2it(p)
Hit(p, Sˆ
2
it(p); ki = 2, QCit) =
∫
QC−it×l−i×εt
1(
∑
j 6=i
S
lj
jt(p,QCjt) + Sˆ
2
it(p) ≥
Dt(p) + εt)dF (QC−it, l−i, εt|Sˆ2it(p), ki = 2, QCit)
=
∫
QC−it×l−i×εt
1(
∑
j 6=i
QCjt +
∑
j 6=i
α
lj
jt(p) + Sˆ
2
it(p) ≥
Dt(p) + εt)dF (QC−it, l−i, εt|Sˆ2it(p), ki = 2, QCit)
=
∫
QC−it×l−i×εt
1(θit ≥ Dt(p)−
∑
j 6=i
α
lj
jt(p)− Sˆ2it(p))
dF (QC−it, l−i, εt|Sˆ2it(p), ki = 2, QCit) (2.6)
where, as before, θit ≡
∑
j 6=iQCjt − εt, but lj ∈ {0, 1}.
In this way, we can write Hit just as before but taking into account that θit
corresponds to the difference between the sum of contract position by rivals and εt.
Taking derivatives of H(·) to find HS and Hp and plugging into to solve for HSHp :
Hs (p, S
∗
it(p); ki, QCit)
Hp (p, S∗it(p); ki, QCit)
=
∫
l−i
γ
(
Dt(p)−
∑
j 6=i α
lj
jt(p)− Sˆ2it(p)
)
·∆(l−i)
− ∫
l−i
γ
(
Dt(p)−
∑
j 6=i α
lj
jt(p)− Sˆ2it(p)
)
D′t(p)∆(l−i)
.
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Therefore, when solving for any type k bidder for k > 0, we use this iterative
procedure that relies on the assumption that bidders type 0 submit perfectly inelastic
bid functions.
Next, we make two assumptions about and ∆i(·) and Γi(·). For ∆i(·), we adopt
the Poisson assumption from Camerer et al. [2004]:
Assumption 2.2 ∆(·) is an independent multivariate Poisson distribution trun-
cated at k − 1, as given by Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy model.
Finally, for Γi we assume it is a uniform distribution.
Assumption 2.3 Γi(·) is a uniform distribution.
Allowing for other distributions, such as Normal, is possible, though it increases
the computational burden as one needs to solve the first-order condition by successive
approximations.
Proposition 2.2 Under the assumption that Γi(·) is uniform, the value of γ(·) in
HS and Hp is independent of rival type, so the first-order condition simplifies to
p− C ′it
(
Sˆkit(p)
)
=
1
−RD′t(p)
∗
[
Sˆkit(p)−QCit
]
,
It is computationally straightforward to solve for the Sˆkit(p) that solves the above
equation. This yields a straightforward method to calculate firm i’s best-response bid
function for any type k. To see this, note that the equation above is just the familiar
“inverse elasticity pricing rule”. Firm markups of bid over marginal cost are inversely
proportional to their residual demand elasticity. Each component of the residual
demand function can be iteratively solved for, using our data and Assumptions 2.1-
2.3.
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2.5 Estimation and Results
2.5.1 Details on Estimation
Estimation follows a minimum-distance approach. Key to this approach is τi, a
scalar that provides information about firm i’s type. We assume that τi = exp(X
′
iγ)
and, because Xi is public information, so it is τi.
Each firm i observes τ−i, the vector of τ ’s of its rivals. Also, each firm i has
private information about its own type. Assume firm i is type k ∈ {0, . . . , K}. If
k = 0, then, by Assumption 2.1 above, firm i would submit a vertical bid on its own
contract position, regardless of its rivals. For all k 6= 0, firms have beliefs about its
rivals’ type. Specifically, by Assumption 2.2, these believes are assumed to follow a
Poisson distribution truncated at k, meaning that firm i believes all its rivals to be
type k−1 or less. The specific probability associated with each type varies according
to each rivals’ τ .
Then, we can use the model to compute, for each firm i and auction t, the optimal
bid function given i’s type and its beliefs over its rivals’ type. Note, however, that in
a specific auction, even if two bidders are of the same type, differences in (observed)
marginal costs will generate differences in predicted bids.
Once firm i has computed what it expects its rivals to do for each possible type,
it maximizes expected profits according to its beliefs about its rivals’ types. This
results in a bid function, conditional on i′s type. However, types are unknown to
the econometrician. For this reason, we proceed as follows. First, we compute bid
functions over a grid of price points. Denote a price point by p. Second, we compute
the square of the scaled difference between the bid data for bidder i in auction t at
price point p and the bid predicted by the model for i when we assume i to be of
type k. Scaling is done using the quantity-difference between the predicted bid for
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each firm for types K and 0. Third, we sum these differences across price points
for bidder i in auction t, weighting price points by a triangular distribution centered
at the market clearing price. Fourth, as all of this is done conditional on bidder i
being type k, we weight each of these sums by the probability of a firm of being of
each type. This probability is modeled as following a Poisson distribution truncated
at the number of possible types considered in estimation (level-0 and 20 levels of
strategic sophistication) and not truncated at each firms’ beliefs. We use each firms’
τ to compute this probability. Finally, we add over firms and auctions.
In this context, our estimate γˆ is
ω(γˆ) =
∑
i
∑
t
[∑
k
[∑
p
( bdatait (p)− bmodelit (p|k)
bmodelit (p|K)− bmodelit (p|0)
)2
× P(p)
]
Pi(k| |K|, γˆ)
]
,
where P(p) corresponds to the probability of observing a price point p as given by the
triangular distribution and Pi(k| |K|, γˆ) corresponds to the probability of bidder i
being type k, conditional on there being |K| possible types and γˆ being the estimated
parameters.
2.5.2 Results: Estimated Parameters
To guarantee that we find the global minimum, we run estimation starting from
50 sets of random initial points. We then re-estimate via Bootstrap starting each
Bootstrap estimation from the set of points that minimized the objective function in
the first stage. We do this for two specifications that differ in how τi is computed.
The first specification includes only size in the parametrization of τ , while the second
one uses size and size squared. The estimated parameters are reported in Table 2.1
and the implied probability distributions over type for the first two specifications are
presented in figure 2.4.
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Table 2.1: Structural model: estimated parameters
(1) (2)
Constant -0.547 -0.126
(0.164) (0.084)
Size 15.625 -1.604
(1.766) (0.357)
Size2 88.257
(6.558)
Number of auctions 99 99
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors us-
ing 20 samples.
Type
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
11%
22%
28%
36%
44%
56%
54%
69%
78%
80%
87%
100%
Installed capacity
relative to largest fir
(a) τi = exp(γ0 + γ1sizei)
Type
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
11%
22%
28%
36%
44%
56%
54%
69%
78%
80%
87%
100%
Installed capacity
relative to largest fi
(b) τi = exp(γ0 + γ1sizei + γ2size
2
i )
Figure 2.4: Estimated distributions of types allowing for 21 types (level-0 and 20
levels of strategic sophistication)
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It is important to make a number of comments regarding the estimates and
figures. First, we expect the constant to be negative in order to rationalize level-0
players, as a positive constant would decrease the probability of observing a level-0
player significantly. Note, however, that this is not required by the CH model as one
need not observe level-0 behavior in the data. However, as we have specified level-0
behavior according to what we observe in our data, a negative constant shows that
the type of level-0 behavior that we have assumed is not uncommon.
Second, as described above, larger firms appear to be higher-level thinkers, though
there is significant heterogeneity across firms, which shows up in that the first spec-
ification has a positive coefficient on size but the second specification has a negative
one and a positive coefficient on sized squared. This means that only the largest
firms actually engage in behavior that is similar to what a Bayesian Nash model
would predict.
Third, the number of types allowed in estimation plays an important role. Specif-
ically, if one allows for many types wanting the data to “talk” about which types are
actually relevant, then for a large number of types, all predicted bids are identical as
bids converge as type increases. As a consequence, starting estimation from multiple
initial values is critical as one may reach local minima. Having said this, we do not
find two set of different estimated parameters that result in the minimum objective
function.
2.6 Counterfactual Analysis: Increasing Strategic Sophistication
Having estimated our model of bidding behavior that allows for heterogeneity
in strategic sophistication, we now turn to a key question of this paper: How does
the lack of strategic sophistication affect market efficiency? As described above, HP
show that most of all productive inefficiencies can be explained by bidding depart-
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ing from Bayesian Nash bidding, while the rest is explained by the exploitation of
market power in an oligopoly setting. For this reason, we now turn to studying how
increasing strategic sophistication of low-type firms may affect efficiency. We do this
in two steps. We first ask how exogenous increases in strategic sophistication of
specific firms affect market efficiency. We believe this is an important first step as
market structure does not change with this intervention. Hence, though the actual
intervention may appear as unreal (though consulting and hiring more qualified em-
ployees to operate the trading floor are probably good examples that could fit in this
description), it provides a way to isolate the impact of increasing sophistication in
the absence of changes in market power. We then turn to studying how increases in
strategic sophistication that result from low-type firms merging with high-type firms,
may affect market efficiency. In this case, bidding approaches that of Bayesian Nash
but market concentration increases as well. Hence, the overall effect of the merger is
ex-ante unknown.
To keep our results in perspective, it is important to note that there is an upper
bound on the magnitude of the effects studied in our simulations. Indeed, while a
social planner would minimize dispatch cost by inducing generation at marginal costs,
we lack data on marginal costs for all bidders. These means that in our simulations
the benchmark will not be the outcome of the social planner but that of a planner
that forces firms in the CH to bid at their marginal costs but keeps bids of firms not
included in the CH as they are in the data. For this reason, we measure all resulting
inefficiencies with respect to this benchmark. Nonetheless, because the unmodeled
fringe includes firms for which we do have marginal cost data for some auctions, we
define as “Social Planner” the outcome of the simulation in which all firms for which
we have marginal cost data bid their marginal costs and those firms for which we do
not have marginal cost data bid according to their realized bids.
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2.6.1 Exogenous Increase
Table 2.2 present results for the two specifications presented in table 2.1. We
report results separately for auctions with positive and balancing demand as this
makes comparisons easier.
The results show that, regardless of the specification, exogenously increasing so-
phistication of a large fraction of low-type firms has significant impact on efficiency.
Indeed, when using the first specification of table 2.1 and considering auctions with
positive balancing demand (INC side), we find that the estimated inefficiency de-
creases by 17.4% relative to the baseline (the model at the estimated parameters),
with the remaining inefficiencies being caused by the exploitation of market power.
In the case of auctions with negative balancing demand (DEC side, column 2), we
find that increasing sophistication results in reducing inefficiencies by 8.3%. Similar
results are obtained when considering the second specification of table 2.1.
The results also show that there are decreasing returns to increasing sophistica-
tion. Indeed, the last row of table 2.2 shows that increasing sophistication to the
median type results in essentially identical efficiency gains to those that follow from
increasing sophistication to the highest estimated type.
Finally, there is one important result that is not presented in the table and
that has to be discussed. This is that increasing sophistication of just one firm has
little effect on efficiencies. It is necessary for a group of low-type firms to increase
sophistication for efficiency to increase significantly.
2.6.2 Endogenous Increase: Mergers
We now turn to studying how mergers may affect efficiency. As mentioned above,
we focus on potential mergers that do not generate cost synergies but do increase
concentration. In this setting, mergers can only increase efficiency by relocating
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Table 2.2: Counterfactuals: exogenous increase in sophistication
Average cost of generation (US dollars)
τˆi = exp(γˆ0 + γˆ1 sizei) τˆi = exp(γˆ0 + γˆ1 sizei + γˆ2 size
2
i )
Scenario INC side DEC side INC side DEC side
Social Planner 8721.28 -46674.69 8721.28 -46674.69
CH firms bidding MC 16352.42 -39536.33 16352.42 -39536.33
Baseline 23663.82 -31850.44 24425.79 -31221.04
Low-type firms to high 22390.97 -32505.22 22480.30 -32418.45
Low-type to median 22420.11 -32488.84 24214.91 -32402.31
Note: These numbers are computed using the estimates in table 2.1. Calculations are
done separately for auctions with positive balancing demand (INC side, 60 auctions)
and negative balancing demand (DEC side, 39 auctions).
generation from high-cost, high-type firms to low-cost, low-type firms that have
priced themselves out of the market. For this reason, to model the merger we take
into account two sources of data. First, the marginal cost of each of the firms
involved in the merger. Second, the day-ahead schedule of each of the merging
parties. Then, we horizontally add the marginal cost functions and the day-ahead
schedules to compute the marginal cost of supplying power to the grid for the merged
firm, relative to the aggregate day-ahead schedule. This is shown in figure 2.5 for
one of the auctions in the data.
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Figure 2.5: Marginal costs, day-ahead schedule, and net marginal costs
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In this setting, we explore two potential mergers. The first one corresponds
to a merger between a small firm and the largest one. The second one considers
the merger of the two largest firms. These results, that only consider the second
specification of table 2.1, show that mergers between the two largest firms result in
the smallest increase in efficiency because there is little generation to rellocate and
the increase in market power limits the gains from this rellocation. Furthermore,
the increase in sophistication of the second largest firm has no impact on the bids
of the smaller firms under the assumptions of the CH model as the second largest
firm was of higher type than all small firms before the merger. Hence, the gains
in efficiency from this merger are small and only due to rellocation of generation.
Second, the biggest gain in efficiency is obtained from the merger between the largest
and the smallest firm (19.6% reduction in inefficiency for auctions with positive
balancing demand and 68% for auctions with negative balancing demand). These
gains, however, come from three sides. First, there is a direct effect of rellocation of
generation. Second, the newly formed firm also has correct beliefs about its rivals
and bids more competitively. Third, all rivals observe the increase in sophistication
of the generating units that belonged to the smallest firm in the merger and bid more
aggresively (conditional on their types). This is recognized by the newly created firm
and induces this firm to bid more aggresively too.
2.7 Summary
Models of strategic equilibrium form the foundation of many studies in industrial
organization that investigate market efficiency in oligopoly settings. These models
rely on the existence of a unique mapping from unobserved fundamentals, such as
marginal costs or valuations, to observed prices or bids, to study questions about
market efficiency and evaluate policy interventions, among others. However, there is
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Table 2.3: Counterfactuals: increasing sophistication via mergers
Average cost of generation (US dollars)
τˆi = exp(γˆ0 + γˆ1 sizei + γˆ2 size
2
i )
Scenario INC side DEC side
Social Planner 8721.28 -46674.69
CH firms bidding MC 16352.42 -39536.33
Baseline 24425.79 -31221.04
Merger 1: Small and big firm 22840.84 -36850.03
Merger 2: Two largest firms 24070.73 -32727.13
Note: These numbers are computed using the estimates in the second spec-
ification of table 2.1. Calculations are done separately for auctions with
positive balancing demand (INC side, 60 auctions) and negative balancing
demand (DEC side, 39 auctions).
some evidence suggesting that the application of such strategic equilibrium models to
all settings has to be done with caution, as in some settings observed behavior may
depart significantly and persistently from what equilibrium models predict. Further-
more, the literature has shown that these departures from (Bayesian) Nash behavior
may have significant implications for efficiency.
In this chapter we study bidding in the Texas electricity market, a market in which
bidding by some firms departs significantly from what Bayesian Nash models predicts,
while bidding from other firms closely resembles these predictions. We use this
setting, as well as a unique dataset containing information on bids and marginal costs,
to embed a Cognitive Hierarchy model into a structural model of bidding behavior.
Our unique dataset, in addition to our model, allows us to identify and estimate
heterogeneity in levels of strategic sophistication across electricity generators. Our
results show that while small firms seem to behave as if they were boundedly rational
in a Cognitive Hierarchy way, large firms behave closely to what a Bayesian Nash
model would predict. We then use the estimated levels of strategic sophistication to
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study how increasing strategic sophistication of low-type firms, either exogenously or
through mergers with higher-type firms, may affect efficiency. Our results show that
not only exogenously increasing sophistication may increase efficiency significantly,
but that also mergers that do not generate cost synergies but increase concentration
may also increase efficiency as long as the higher sophistication of one of the merging
parties is transfered to the rest of firms involved in the merger.
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3. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS MERGERS
3.1 Introduction
Governments are frequently forced to predict the impacts of mergers on the evo-
lution of markets because breaking up consummated mergers could be extremely
costly. The technique known as merger simulation is usually used by governments
and researchers to forecast price and welfare changes caused by prospective mergers
and to challenge mergers that are predicted to increase market price and decrease
welfare. In a standard merger simulation exercise, the demand system is recovered
using pre-merger data, marginal costs are estimated using firms’ first order condition
and price and welfare changes in the next period are simulated under the assump-
tion of a static oligopoly game. As is mentioned in Weinberg and Hosken [2013],
there might be bias in such simulation. The bias might come from the fact that
only changes in the period right after the merger are considered in a merger review.
There are many reasons to believe long-term welfare changes after a merger should
be reviewed as well because a merger could have a considerable impact on the dy-
namic evolution of the market. Structural changes of the market after the merger
would lead to post-merger changes in firms’ behavior. Both merging and non-merging
firms would adjust their entry, exit, investment or price strategies according to the
new market structure. In addition, a current merger might trigger future mergers,
therefore, mergers happening after a successful one should also be considered when
reviewing a prospective merger.
Take the U.S. airline industry as an example. The Delta-Northwest merger was
proposed in April 2008 and was cleared by the Department of Justice on October 29,
2008. A standard merger simulation exercise would suggest that this merger would
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reduce the competition, allow airlines to raise their ticket prices and provide poorer
service. However, raw data exhibited exactly the opposite. Memphis, for example,
was considered to be one of the worst affected cities by the Delta-Northwest merger
in terms of market concentration. According to figure 3.1, the average ticket prices of
Delta and Northwest airlines in Memphis decreased after the merger while the market
price in Memphis stayed the same. Furthermore, figure 3.2 shows that the average
flight frequency of Delta and Northwest increased after Northwest began to use Delta
as its title in 2010. It seems that traditional merger simulations fail to forecast price
and service quality changes after that merger. Figure 3.3 provides one of the many
reasons as to why this happens. According to figure 3.3, the number of markets Delta
used to serve in U.S. domestic market decreased from about 500-650 to 350-500. In
fact, Delta began to cut off the routes served in Memphis after the merger and later
the Memphis hub was officially closed in September, 2013. Since their market power
after merger in Memphis was reduced because of exit behavior, average itinerary
fare of Delta in Memphis decreased instead of increasing. Furthermore, Delta could
concentrate on those remaining markets to provide higher flight frequency since they
reduced the number of markets they served. Clearly that exit behavior and many
other firm behaviors after a prospective merger could have significant effect on the
evolution of a market, but traditional static merger simulation exercises might miss
these changes and therefore provide poor forecast.
All of these suggest a need to build dynamic models of mergers. However, the
merger literature has moved very slowly in doing so. It is not that people are not
aware of the dynamic features mergers exhibit, but the complication that come with
modeling dynamic mergers and the computational burden involved in estimating
those models have kept researchers from developing a more flexible model. A small
number of papers analyze mergers in dynamic settings. Gowrisankaran [1999] suc-
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Figure 3.1: Average ticket price of Delta and Northwest and market average
price in Memphis - The data comes from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey
(DB1B) provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).
Figure 3.2: Average flight frequency of Delta and Northwest - The data comes
from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) provided by the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT).
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Figure 3.3: Number of markets that Delta and Northwest served in the U.S.
domestic market - The data comes from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey
(DB1B) provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).
cessfully models a dynamic endogenous merger process. However, his paper imposes
equilibrium selection rule on merger game’s multiple equilibria and can only simulate
the effect of artificial mergers. In his sequential game, larger firms have the priority
to merge with smaller firms. Smaller firms can merge with other small firms only
when all larger firms have failed in their merger attempts. Additionally, his model
fails to include the situation where a small firm acquires a large firm. In Chen [2009],
a dynamic oligopoly model under capacity constraint is used, but the merger is just
a one-time exogenous shock in his model. These two methods are complicated and
are hard to apply when considering prospective mergers.
Benkard et al. [2010] examines the effect of several mergers within the U.S. airline
industry in a dynamic setting. The straightforward simulation method proposed in
their paper provides a computationally easy way to implement model by avoiding
repeatedly computing the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium in a dynamic oligopoly
41
model. However, like Chen [2009], their method also assumes that a merger is an
one-time exogenous shock. They can only exam the medium and long term effect of
a merger without considering future mergers in markets. The dynamic endogenous
merger process is not modeled in their method.
The theoretical equilibrium concept of dynamic oligopoly game, referred to as
Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, is proposed in Maskin and Tirole [1988a, 1988b].
Ericson and Pakes [1995] add to this a framework by which we can empirically analyse
dynamic oligopoly game. Their method has proven versatile in analysing dynamic
evolution of markets. The early estimation methods for dynamic oligopoly game
turn out to be quantitatively burdensome and difficult to apply to industries with a
more complicated structure.
In recent years, researchers have proposed several new methods to ease the com-
putational burden of estimating dynamic oligopoly model. These include Bajari et
al. [2007] (hereafter BBL), Aguirregabiria and Mira [2007], and Pakes et al. [2007],
etc. With newly available estimation methods, the Ericson and Pakes [1995] model
has been used to tackle many empirical problems. Recent empirical applications
of dynamic oligopoly models using new computational methods include advertising,
capacity accumulation, and learning by doing. In this paper, we extend the classic
Ericson and Pakes [1995] model and include merger as a dynamic strategy. To be
more specific, we built a dynamic game with five steps in each period. These five
steps are merger, exit, production, entry and investment respectively.
Our infinite repeated five-step game follows Gowrisankaran [1999], but our as-
sumption of merger game diverges from his framework. As is mentioned in Gowrisankaran
[1999], merger games involving more than two firms possess the problem of multiple
equilibria, he has to impose equilibrium selection rule on his merger game because
of the limitation of econometric method in solving a multi-equilibria game.
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In recent years, much work has been done to solve the inference of multiple
equilibria. One of the methods that has been fruitful in both applications and e-
conometric theory is the moment inequality condition method.1 With the help of
newly available econometric estimation technique, we are able to build a more intu-
itive dynamic merger process and identify that merger game. In our game, every firm
proposes a simultaneous bid for every other firm and it gets a asking price from other
firms. As long as the post merger expected discounted value (value function) of the
buyer is larger than the sum of the before merger expected discounted value (value
function) of the two participants, the merger might happen. The particular merger
which occurs depends on factors found unnecessary in our model. For instance, the
final buyer may make her move earliest or act more aggressively. This more intuitive
game can be identified with the necessary conditions in our game. The moment
inequality conditions method proposed in Tamer [2003] identifies the binary choice
in a two agent game with multiple equilibria and is applied in our multiple choice
multiple agents game as well.
We propose an infinite repeated dynamic game with five steps in each period
and a three-step estimation method to identify our model. We estimate the model
from the last step to the first step using backwards induction. The last four steps
of the game (exit, production, entry and investment) are simultaneously estimated
following the spirit of the two-step estimation proposed by BBL [2007]. This method
is an appealing solution to deal with complicated industry structures. It can capture
the industry structures easily and the compute value function relatively quick by
avoiding computing Markov perfect Nash equilibrium.
In the first step, we estimate policy functions and transition functions of the
1Ciliberto and Tamer [2009] uses moment inequality condition studying firm entry behavior in
the U.S. airline industry.
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dynamic game. In the second step, value functions of the game under various initial
states are simulated. Then, in the third step, the moment inequality condition is
implemented to identify the merger game using the value function estimators from
the second step. With a fully identified structural model, we can forecast medium
and long term effects of mergers. Additionally, the model forecasts the effect of
a merger more accurately when there exists strategic behavior after a merger. The
three-step estimation method presented here proves relatively simple to compute and
easily applied to review prospective mergers.
3.2 Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium
In a typical dynamic oligopoly model, time is infinite and firms repeatedly choose
their strategies at each period. For example, in the classic Ericson and Pakes [1995]
model, firms make entry and exit decisions and choose their investment and produc-
tion level according to current state at each period. Markov perfect Nash equilibrium
(hereafter MPNE), which is a generalization of Nash equilibrium, is the equilibrium
concept used in dynamic oligopoly games. In the games, no firm wants to unilat-
erally deviate from a strategy set in MPNE. Every agent chooses strategies (policy
functions) to maximize her expected discounted profit (value function) each period.
The firm value function is represented as the conditional expectation of discounted
long-term profits:
E[Σ∞t β
τ−tpii(στ , sτ , viτ )|sτ ]
Here, pii is profit function, στ is a vector that contains policy functions of each firm,
sτ represents state such as firm capacity or product quality at time τ , viτ is firm
specific random shock, and β is discount factor, which captures the fact that firms
value current profit more than future profits.
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The distribution of state in the next period only depends on all firms’ policy
function made in this period and current state. Therefore, state in the next period
st+1 is distributed as a Markov process:
P (st+1|σt, st)
Since the behavior is given by Markov stratgy, we can rewrite value function as a
Bellman equation:
Vi(s;σ) = Ev
[
pii(σ(s,v), s, vi) + β
∫
Vi(s
′,σ)dP (s′|σ(s,v), s)|s
]
We claim σ is Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium if for each firm, σi is her best
response given that other firms do not change their policy function:
Vi(s;σ) ≥ Vi(s;σ′i,σ−i)
Here,
Vi(s;σ
′
i,σ−i) =Ev
[
pii(s;σ
′
i(s, vi),σ−i(s,v−i), vi)
∫
+β
∫
Vi(s
′;σ′i(s, vi),σ−i(s,v−i), s)dP (s
′|s, σ′i(s, vi),σ−i(s,v−i))|s
]
3.3 Model: An Infinite Repeated Five-Step Game
In a static merger game, a merger is usually followed by a one-period production
which is assumed to be some production games as shown in Cournot or Bertrand. Our
endogenous dynamic merger game is an infinitely repeated version of the static one.
To be more specific, a merger process is followed by an exit, a Bertrand production
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game among the firms that are still in the market, and finally investment and entry
decisions. These five steps are then repeated over and over. Our dynamic model is
also an extension of the Ericson and Pakes [1995] model. We add merger process
into their game, which involves exit, production, entry and investment. Our model
captures firms’ dynamic behaviors after a merger and that merger’s impact on the
evolution of markets.
3.3.1 Merger
Two obstacles impede the development of modeling dynamic merger procedure:
nonexistence of equilibrium and multiple equilibria. We detail the reasons below and
explain our methods to solve each setback.
Existence of equilibrium of dynamic model is generally shown by Brouwer’s fixed-
point theorem which requires the continuity of the operator, but here the after merg-
er value function of nonparticipants are discontinuous. We follow Gowrisankaran
[1999]’s method and add a source of randomness to the merger process, but our as-
sumption on the source of randomness differs in that we assume that a firm’s after
merger value function is not only determined by the value function predicted under
the post-merger industry structure, but also other factors like bargaining power. For
instance, even if a potential buyer knows the after merger value of the firm that she
is interested in, the potential seller might want to bargain a higher price. Therefore,
the merger would proceed under a higher price. Here, we assume this randomness
from bargaining is independently and identically drawn from a mean-zero uniform
distribution U [−ς, ς].
To the best of our knowledge, Gowrisankaran [1999] is the only paper which
successfully models an endogenous merger process. He solves multiple equilibria by
imposing a sequential merger process assumption. In his game, larger firms have the
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priority to merge with smaller firms. Smaller firms can merge with others only after
all larger firms have failed in their attempts in mergers. However, his model fails to
include the situation where a small firm acquires a large firm. Moreover, he claims
that even under this assumption, the multiple equilibrium problem is not solved.
A sequential merger process can only avoid some of the major sources of multiple
equilibria. Instead of imposing restrictive assumption on merger game, we will give a
more intuitive merger game and use moment inequality method proposed in Tamer
[2003] to solve the game with multiple equilibria directly. We will explain how this
method works in more detail in Section 3.4.
Let us first describe the merger game process. In our game, every firm proposes
a simultaneous bid for every other firm and it gets a asking price from other firms.
As long as the post merger expected future value of the buyer is bigger than the sum
of the before merger expected future value of the two participants, the merger might
happen. The particular merger which would happen depends on factors not specified
in the game which will not affect our estimation. For instance, the final buyer might
make her move earliest. In this case, let ml = {m1,m2, ...,mn} denote one possible
merger outcome in a market where mi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Here, −1 represents a scenario
in which firm i is merged by another firm, 0 means that firm i does not participate
in the merger process, and 1 means that firm i is the buyer.
LetM denote a set that contains all merger outcomes. DefineMM asM/{0, ..., 0}.
Here, MM contains all merger outcomes except the one that no merger happens
({0, ..., 0}). Let V bfbuyer(sbf ,ml) denote the value function of buyer before merger,
V afbuyer(s
bf ,ml) represent the value function of buyer after merger, ulk denote the
random shock we have mentioned earlier, and V bfseller(s
bf ,ml) denote the value func-
tion of buyer before merger. For a specific merger outcome ml, it is one potential
outcome in the market under before merger state sbf if:
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V afbuyer(s
bf ,ml) + ulk > V bfbuyer(sbf ,ml) + V
bf
seller(s
bf ,ml) (3.1)
Let MM(1) denote the set of merger outcomes in M
M that satisfy condition (3.1).
(a) If |MM(1)| > 1, there are more than one ml which satisfy (3.1) and any one
of them can be the merger outcome, i.e., ∀j,mj ∈ MM(1) merger outcomes exist. As
mentioned previously, outside factors not considered here may determine the chosen
merger.2
(b) If |MM(1)| = 1, there is only one ml which satisfies (3.1). In this case, ml is
the merger outcome.
(c) If |MM(1)| = 0, there is no ml which satisfies (3.1). Then no merger will happen
making {0, 0, ..., 0} the only outcome.
3.3.2 Exit
After the merger, every incumbent firm decides simultaneously whether or not to
exit the market with a scrap value φ. Suppose there are n incumbent firms in the
market and we define χ(s) = {χ1(s), ..., χi(s), ..., χn(s)} as a vector of exit policy
functions. An incumbent firm i will exit the market when its scrap value φ is larger
than its value function.
χi(s) =

1 if si > 0 & φ > pii(s¯i)− xi(s¯i) + β
∫
Vi(s¯;σ(s))dP (s¯|σ(s), s)
0 otherwise
where s¯ = (χ1, ..., χi−1, 1, χi+1, ..., χn) · s represents after merger state in the next
period, and σ(s) is policy functions at state s. χi(s) = 1 means the firm will stay in
2Here, | · | denotes the number of value in the set.
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the market and χi(s) = 0 means the firm will exit the market.
3.3.3 Production
Following the typical assumption of the Ericson and Pakes model, we model
production process as a static Bertrand game. We assume a logit demand system.
Consumer r gets utility Uri from consuming good i,
Uri = γ0ln(si) + γ1ln(yr − pi) + εri
where si represents the quality of good i, yr is person r’s income, pi is the price
of good i, and εri is a independently and identically distributed logit error term. For
simplicity, incomes for all consumers are assumed to be a constant, yr = y. We also
assume that each firm has a constant marginal cost:
mc(qi, µ) = µ.
3.3.4 Entry and Investment
The last two steps of the game are entry and investment. It is common practice
to assume that they happen simultaneously at each period because both of them
contribute to the state evolution. A firms state sit+1 at period t+ 1 is affected by its
investment in period t in the following way:
sit+1 = sit + νit − ν¯t
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Here, νit represents firm i’s random return of investment xit realized in the next
period and α denotes the parameter.
νit =

1 with prob. αxit/(1 + αxit)
0 with prob. 1/(1 + αxit)
ν¯t is an industry wide random depreciation at period t and market state decreases
by 1 with probability δ.
ν¯t =

1 with prob. δ
0 with prob. 1− δ
For a situation in which entry happened simultaneously with investment, each
potential entrant receives a random entry cost from a uniform distribution U(−e, e).
The firm knows its entry cost before it makes entry decision. If it chooses to enter
the market, potential entrants state at next period is sE − ν¯t.
3.4 Three-step Estimation Method
We estimate the model from the last step to the first step using backwards in-
duction. The last four steps of the game (exit, production, entry and investment)
are simultaneously estimated following the spirit of the two-step estimation proposed
by BBL [2007]. The BBL [2007] method is chosen here because it is an appealing
method to deal with complicated industry structures. It can capture the industry
structures easily and compute the value function relatively quickly without comput-
ing MPNE even once. In the first step, we estimate policy functions and transition
functions of the dynamic game. Second, value functions of the game under various
initial states are simulated. Then, in the third step, we apply the moment inequality
conditions proposed in Tamer [2003] to identify the merger game using the value
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function estimators from the second step.
To reduce computation, we assume firms’ profit functions are linear in the un-
known parameters like BBL [2007]. Therefore, their value functions are also linear
in parameters in that:
Vi(s) = W
1(s) +W 2(s) · ξ +W 3(s) · φ (3.2)
Since W 1(s), W 2(s), W 3(s) can be estimated from simulation in the 2nd step,
estimation of Vi(s) can be represented as a function with two parameters:
Vˆi(s) = Wˆ
1(s) + Wˆ 2(s) · ξ + Wˆ 3(s) · φ (3.3)
≡ f(ξ, φ, s) (3.4)
Now again, let us define V bfi as before merger incumbent value function and
V afi as after merger incumbent value function for firm i. Define s
bf ∈ S as before
merger state and safl ∈ S as its after merger state when merger outcome is ml. We
can estimate before merger value function from Vˆ bfi (s
bf ,ml) = f(ξ, φ, s
bf ) and after
merger value function from Vˆ afi (s
bf ,ml) = f(ξ, φ, s
af
l ). Moving forward, we can
identify the merger game with moment inequality conditions using these before and
after merger value functions.
3.4.1 A Simple 2× 2 Entry Game
In this section, a 2×2 game is used to show the identification problem of multiple
equilibria and illustrate the main idea of moment inequality conditions which are
proposed by Tamer [2003] to solve the problem of multi-equilibria. Then, we describe
the moment inequality conditions which are used to identify our merger game.
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(1, 1)
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(0, 0)
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(1, 0)
Model predicts
(0, 1) or (1, 0)
ε1
ε2
(−α1X1,−α2X2)
(−α1X1 − δ2,−α2X2 − δ1)
Figure 3.4: Entry game with multiple equilibria
Let us consider a binary simultaneous equation system:
y1 = 1[α
′
1X1 + δ2y2 + ε1 ≥ 0],
y2 = 1[α
′
2X2 + δ1y1 + ε2 ≥ 0],
where X1 and X2 are vectors of observed firm-specific exogenous regressors. This
game can be viewed as a two agent entry game. A firm’s entry decision depends on
its own characteristics and whether its competitor enter the market. As is shown in
Tamer [2003], this game has multiple equilibria if support for ε is large enough. In
figure 3.4, multiple equilibria appear in the shade region.
This multiple equilibrium problem complicates the estimation process because
it proves impossible to find out the theoretical probability of the realization of a
market outcome when it is difficult to determine which equilibrium is realized in the
overlapping multiple equilibrium region. Hence, an equilibrium selection rule must
be specified in a traditional method. This rule is used to “pick up” an equilibrium
from the multiple equilibria.
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Usually, there is little guidance on how to choose the rule. To avoid an unrealistic
assumption about the equilibrium selection, Tamer [2003] proposed the following
method, which gets around imposing any assumption about the multiple equilibrium
selection process.
Let us consider the case where (y1, y2) = (1, 0) is the market outcome.
Pr(1, 0|X) =Pr((ε1, ε2) ∈ R1(X, θ))+∫
Pr(1, 0|ε1, ε2, X)1[(ε1, ε2) ∈ R2(X, θ)]dFε1,ε2
where
R1(θ,X) ={(ε1, ε2) : (ε1 ≥ −α′1X1; ε2 ≤ −α′2X2}
∪ (ε1 ≥ −α′1X1 − δ2;−α′2X2 ≤ ε2 ≤ −α′2X2 − δ1)},
R2(θ,X) ={(ε1, ε2) : (−α′1X1 ≤ ε1 ≤ −α′1X1 − δ2;
− α′2X2 ≤ ε2 ≤ −α′2X2 − δ1)},
P r(1, 0|ε1, ε2, X) is the selection mechanism for multi-equilibria.
Furthermore, the above equation implies the following inequality condition:
Pr((ε1, ε2) ∈ R1) ≤ Pr((1, 0)) ≤ Pr((ε1, ε2) ∈ R1) + Pr((ε1, ε2) ∈ R2) (3.5)
In figure 3.5, the shaded area in the graph on the right hand side represents the
region that would predict (1, 0) uniquely, which is R1. The shaded area in the graph
on the left hand side represents the region that (1, 0) is a possible outcome, which
represents R1 +R2.
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Figure 3.5: Upper and lower bounds for entry game
For the simple 2 × 2 game, we can represent all the inequality conditions in the
following way:
H1(θ,X) ≡

H11 (θ, X)
H21 (θ, X)
H31 (θ, X)
H41 (θ, X)

≤

Pr((0, 0)|X)
Pr((1, 0)|X)
Pr((0, 1)|X)
Pr((1, 1)|X)

≤

H12 (θ, X)
H22 (θ, X)
H32 (θ, X)
H42 (θ, X)

≡H2(θ,X)
where H1(θ,X) is the lower bound function which represents the probability
that a particular market structure is the unique equilibrium. H2(θ,X) is the upper
bound function which also counts the probability that multiple equilibria happen in
the market. H1(θ,X) and H2(θ,X) can be analytically solved when the distribu-
tion of ε = {ε1, ε2} is assumed to be known. For example, H11 and H12 can be solved
from equation (3.5). The above inequality condition is then used to identify the 2×2
simple game.
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3.4.2 Moment Inequality Conditions in the Merger Game
According to the merger game we propose in section 3.3, we can use the following
moment inequality conditions to estimate the dynamic parameters. Suppose that
Pr(ml|sbf ) is the probability of merger outcome ml happens when state is sbf . We
can derive the inequality condition for the game as follows:
L(ml|sbf ) ≤ Pr(ml|sbf ) ≤ U(ml|sbf )
Here, L(ml|sbf ) is the lower bound for ml to happen under state sbf . It is the
probability that ml is the only merger outcome that satisfy equation (3.1) at state
sbf . U(ml|sbf ) is the upper bound for ml to happen under state sbf . It is the
probability that ml is the the merger outcome that satisfies equation (3.1) at state
sbf . All the moment inequality conditions of the merger game are represented as
follows:
L(ϑ, sbf) ≡

L1(ϑ, sbf )
.
.
LL(ϑ, sbf )

≤

Pr(m1|sbf )
.
.
P r(mL|sbf )

≤

U1(ϑ, sbf )
.
.
UL(ϑ, sbf )

≡ U(ϑ, sbf)
where ϑ is a vector that contains dynamic parameters ξ, φ and ς.
3.4.3 Simulate Upper and Lower Bounds
In the simple 2×2 game, analytical solutions of upper bound and lower bound can
be easily derived. In our merger game, it is not easy to find the analytical solutions
of the corresponding upper and lower bounds, but we follow Ciliberto and Tamer
[2007]’s simulation method to find them. Let us rewrite equation (3.1) in another
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form:
Π(sbf ,ml) ≡ V afbuyer(sbf ,ml)− V bfbuyer(sbf ,ml)− V bfseller(sbf ,ml) + ul (3.6)
If Π(sbf ,ml) > 0, ml is one possible merger outcome when state is sbf .
We first draw R simulations of unobservable for each state sbf . Then we obtain
the Π(sbf ,ml) for every possible ml ∈ M as a function of states, observables, and
parameters. If Π(sbf ,ml) > 0 for some l ∈ L, ml is an potential outcome of that
game (one of the equilibria). If this equilibrium is unique, 1 is added to the lower
bound probability (Lˆ(ml|sbf )) for outcome p(ml|sbf ) and 1 is added to the upper
bound probability (Uˆ(ml|sbf )). If the equilibrium is not unique, then we only add a
1 to the upper bound. For example, the lower bound for merger outcome ml under
state sbf is:
Lˆ(ml|sbf ) = 1
R
R∑
j=1
1
[
Π(sbf ,ml) > 0,Π(sbf ,m−l) < 0
]
which simulate the probability that ml is the only merger outcome at state s
bf .
3.4.4 Identification
To recover the primitives of the model, we can minimize the following objective
function,
Qn(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
||p(ml|sbf )− Lˆ(ml|sbfk )||− + ||p(ml|sbf )− Uˆ(ml|sbf )||+
]
where (A)− = [a11[a1 6 0], ..., an(n−1)+11[an(n−1)+1 6 0]] and similarly (A)+ =
[a11[a1 > 0], ..., an(n−1)+11[an(n−1)+1 > 0]] for a n(n − 1) + 1 vector A, and where
|| · || is the Euclidian norm.
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3.5 Simulation Result
Table 3.1 shows Monte Carlo estimation result of the static primitives including
demand system, marginal cost and investment evolution from our 3-step estimation
method. In general, estimators are very close to true parameters. We follow Benkard
et al. [2010] and Chernozhukov et al. [2007] to infer our dynamic primitives from the
game. Chernozhukov et al. [2007], which is a iterative process involving subsampling
from the second step, is used to do inference of the merger game. We only show the
results from the first step in table 3.2 for now because it extremely time consuming
to do subsampling. According to table 3.2, true value of investment cost falls in
the estimated bounds. Moreover, lower and upper bounds are close to true value.
However, our bounds of scrape value do not contain true value. Although true value
of random shock fall in the estimated interval, the estimated interval are too wide to
contain any information. We expect more accurate bound estimation after we finish
iterative process of Chernozhukov et al. [2007].
Table 3.1: Endogenous merger game Monte Carlo results (static primitives)
Parameter True Value Mean SE
Demand
γ0 0.1 0.100 0.000
γ1 1.5 1.492 0.000
Marginal cost µ 3 2.991 0.000
Investment evolution
δ 0.7 0.755 0.244
ρ 1.25 1.553 0.243
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Table 3.2: Endogenous merger game Monte Carlo results (dynamic primitives)
Parameter True Value Bounds
Investment cost ξ -1 [-2.152, 0.578]
Scrape value φ 6 [11.914, 30.000]
Random shock ς 2 [-28.578, 25.357]
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4. CONCLUSION
This dissertation studies merger simulation exercises used by governments and
researchers to evaluate prospective mergers. Specifically, we extend the traditional
static merger models.
In the second chapter, we build and estimate a model in which firms are bound-
edly rational and simulate the effect of mergers in such settings. Models of strategic
equilibrium form the foundation of many studies in industrial organization that in-
vestigate market efficiency in oligopoly settings. However, there is some evidence
suggesting that the application of such strategic equilibrium models to all settings
has to be done with caution, as in some settings observed behavior may depart signif-
icantly and persistently from what (Bayesian) Nash behavior models predict. In this
chapter,we study bidding in the Texas electricity market, a market in which bidding
by some firms departs significantly from what Bayesian Nash models predicts, while
bidding from other firms closely resembles these predictions. Our unique dataset, in
addition to our model, allows us to identify and estimate heterogeneity in levels of
strategic sophistication across electricity generators. Our results show that not only
exogenously increasing sophistication may increase efficiency significantly, but that
also mergers that do not generate cost synergies but increase concentration may also
increase efficiency as long as the higher sophistication of one of the merging parties
is transfered to the rest of firms involved in the merger.
In the next chapter, we study mergers in a dynamic setting. In a standard
merger simulation exercise, only the price and welfare changes in the next period
are simulated under the assumption of a static oligopoly game. As is mentioned
in Weinberg and Hosken [2013], there might be bias in such simulation. The bias
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might come from the fact that only changes in the period right after the merger
are considered in a merger review. There are many reasons to believe long-term
welfare changes after a merger should be reviewed as well because a merger could
have a considerable impact on the dynamic evolution of the market. In this chapter,
we build an infinite five-step repeated game under the framework of the Ericson and
Pakes model [1995]. Then, we propose a three-step estimation method to estimate the
game in which Markov perfect Nash equilibrium is played. Our three-step estimation
method is flexible and can be easily modified to estimate various market structures.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
A.1 1st Order Condition of Optimality under CH
Suppressing the i and t indices, the maximization problem of player i with level
k is given by,
Max
Sˆ(p)
∫ p
p
(U (p · S(p)− C (S(p))− (p− PC)QC)) dH (p, S(p); k,QC)
Integration by parts of the objective function yields, modulo a constant term:
∫ p¯
p
U ′(pS(p)− C(S(p))− (p− PC)QC)(pS ′(p) + S(p)− C ′(S(p))S ′(p)−QC)
H
(
p, Sˆ(p); k,QC
)
dp
Label the integrand:
F (p, S, S ′) =U ′(pS(p)− C(S(p))− (p− PC)QC)(pS ′(p) + S(p)− C ′(S(p))S ′(p)−QC)
H
(
p, Sˆ(p); k,QC
)
FS =−H lSU ′(·)(pS ′ + S − C ′S ′ −QC) +H lU ′′(·)(p− C ′)(pS ′ + S − C ′S ′ −QC)
+H lU ′(·)(1− C ′′S ′)
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Fs′ = −H lU ′(·)(p− C ′)
d
dp
Fs′ =−H lpU ′(·)(p− C ′) +H lSS ′U ′(·)(p− C ′)
+H lU ′′(·)(p− C ′)(pS ′ + S − C ′S ′ −QC) +H lU ′(·)(1− C ′′S ′)
Since the Euler-Lagrange necessary condition for the optimal S(p) is given by:
d
dp
Fs′ = FS
Therefore,
p− C ′ = HS
Hp
(S −QC)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Given additive separable form of bid function for bidders type 0 to type K from
Proposition 2.1, uncertainty in rivals’ contract obligation, QC−jt, and the aggregate
demand act a parallel shift in residual demand. Thus, all that matters is the dis-
tribution of a scalar random variable that is the sum of functions of rival contract
position (
∑
j 6=iQCjt) and total demand shock (−εt). Hence, for a bidder type k
(k = 0, 1, ..., K), we can rewrite his believe about distribution of market clearing
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price as
Hit(p, Sˆ
k
it(p); ki, QCit)
=
∫
QC−i×l−i×εt
1(
∑
j 6=i
αlj(p) +
∑
j 6=i
QCjt + Sˆ
k
it(p) ≥ Dt(p) + εt)
dF (QC−i, l−i, εt|Sˆkit(p), ki, QCit)
=
∫
QC−i×l−i×εt
1(
∑
j 6=i
QCjt − εt ≥ Dt(p)−
∑
j 6=i
αlj(p)− Sˆkit(p))
dF (QC−i, l−i, εt|Sˆkit(p), ki, QCit)
=
∫
QC−i×l−i×εt
1(θit ≥ Dt(p)−
∑
j 6=i
αlj(p)− Sˆkit(p))dF (QC−i, l−i, εt|Sˆkit(p), ki, QCit)
Let θit denote
∑
j 6=iQCjt − εt, Γ(·) be distribution of θit and ∆(l−i) denote the
marginal distribution of the vector of rival firm types. Then, a bidder type k’s believe
about distribution of market clearing price involves two source of uncertainty, θit and
rival type l−i.
Hit(p, Sˆit(p); ki, QCit) =
∫
l−i
[
1− Γ
(
Dt(p)−
∑
j 6=i
αlj(p)− Sˆkit(p)
)]
·∆(l−i)
Take derivatives to find HS and Hp
HS =
∫
l−i
γ
(
Dt(p)−
∑
j 6=i
αlj(p)− Sˆkit(p)
)
·∆(l−i)
=
∫
l−i
γl−i(p) ·∆(l−i)
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where γ(·) is derivative of Γ(·).
Hp = −
∫
l−i
γ
(
Dt(p)−
∑
j 6=i
αlj(p)− Sˆkit(p)
)(
D′t(p)−
∑
j 6=i
αl ′j (p)
)
·∆(l−i)
= −
∫
l−i
γl−i(p)
(
D′t(p)−
∑
j 6=i
αl ′j (p)
)
·∆(l−i)
Since the residual demand function faces by a bidder type k under a certain belief
about rival type (l−i) is given by
RDit(p, Sˆ
k
it(p); ki, QCit) = Dt(p) + εt −
∑
j 6=i
αljt(p)−
∑
j 6=i
QCjt
with derivative
RD′it(p) = D
′
t(p)−
∑
j 6=i
αl′jt(p)
Therefore,
Hp = −
∫
l−i
γl−i(p)RD′it(p) ·∆(l−i)
Replace Hs and Hp in equation (2.5) that represent first order condition of profit
maximizing problem of a bidder type k, we get
p− C ′it (S∗it(p)) =
∫
l−i
γl−i(p) ·∆(l−i)
− ∫
l−i
γl−i(p)RD′it(p) ·∆(l−i)
(S∗it(p)−QCit)
Then, under assumption 2.3, optimal bidding strategy for a type k bidder, Skit(p),
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is traced out by
p− C ′it
(
Sˆkit(p)
)
=
1
RD′t(p)
∗
[
Sˆkit(p)−QCit
]
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